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 1 
Summary 
When the legal concept of Union citizenship was first introduced in the 
Treaty of the European Union in 1992, few thought that the provisions 
would gain any notable significance beyond the symbolical. But through its 
case law, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has gradually developed a 
body of rights connected to the status of Union citizenship, with the rights 
of residence and free movement, and with “cross-border movement” acting 
as a trigger.  
 
In the Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano cases, the Court challenged its earlier 
doctrine of “wholly internal situation” and introduced a new EU law trigger 
test.  If the expulsion of or the refusal to grant residence rights to a third-
country national (TCN) family member of a Union citizen deprives the latter 
of the “genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights connected to Union 
citizenship”, the measure is precluded. The meaning and implications of this 
line of case law have and continue to be debated intensively by scholars. 
With the consequent cases, McCarthy, Dereci and Iida, it became 
increasingly clear that the scope of the “genuine enjoyment” test is limited 
to when the Union citizen is de facto forced to leave not only the territory of 
the home Member State, but the entire Union territory, if the TCN family 
member is not granted a right of residence.  The inherent logic is that by 
forcing the Union citizen to leave the Union, such a measure also deprives 
the Union citizen of the right to exercise free movement within the Union.  
 
Departing from the premise that the use of rights language functions as a 
tool for legitimizing a political project, in this case the European Union, this 
thesis investigates the relationship between Union citizenship and 
fundamental rights especially in the context of the ‘substance of the rights’ 
doctrine.  
 
It is observed that conflicting discourses on the meaning and contents of 
Union citizenship affect the role of fundamental rights in the case law. The 
universalist narrative envisions Union citizenship as an all-encompassing 
status, guaranteeing rights to all Union citizens regardless of them being 
free movers or sedentary. The alternative narrative is one of traditional 
market citizenship, which sees the Union as predominantly an internal 
market, while the assessment of fundamental rights for those not 
participating on the internal market belongs to the competence of the 
Member States. 
 
Through an analysis of the most recent case law, it is found that the return to 
a more restrictive approach concerning the rights connected to Union 
citizenship, prevalent in Dereci, continues to dominate.   
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Sammanfattning 
När bestämmelserna om unionsmedborgarskap introducerades i Fördraget 
om Europeiska Unionen 1992 var det få som trodde att de skulle få någon 
betydelse bortom det symboliska. Genom en omfattande serie rättsfall har 
EU-domstolen dock utvecklat rättigheter kopplade till unions-
medborgarskap, där uppehållsrätten och rätten att fritt vistas inom Unionen 
är de centrala. Dessa rättigheter aktiveras vid ett gränsöverskridande. 
 
I rättsfallen Rottmann och Ruiz Zambrano utmanade EU-domstolen sin 
tidigare praxis rörande interna situationer. Om en tredjelandsmedborgare 
som är familjemedlem till en unionsmedborgare nekas uppehållsrätt  och 
detta medför att unionsmedborgaren “berövas möjligheten att faktiskt 
åtnjuta kärnan i de rättigheter som tillkommer dem i kraft av unions-
medborgarskapet” är den åtgärden oförenlig med unionsrätten. Innebörden 
och räckvidden av dessa avgöranden har debatterats livligt. Av de efter-
följande avgöranden McCarthy, Dereci och Iida framgick det att 
omfattningen av denna doktrin är begränsad till situationer där en 
unionsmedborgare tvingas att lämna inte bara sin hemstat utan hela unionen 
till följd av att familjemedlemmen nekats härledd uppehållsrätt. Den 
inneboende logiken är att följden av en sådan åtgärd blir att unions-
medborgaren då berövas även sin rätt till fri rörlighet inom unionen.  
 
Med utgångspunkt i idén att en rättighetsdiskurs fungerar som ett verktyg 
för att legitimisera ett politiskt projekt, i detta fall den Europeiska unionen, 
undersöks förhållandet mellan unionsmedborgarskap och grundläggande 
rättigheter i den särskilda kontexten av Ruiz Zambrano-undantaget. 
 
Motstridiga diskurser om unionsmedborgarskapsbegreppets innebörd 
påverkar sättet hur grundläggande rättigheter behandlas i EU-domstolens 
rättspraxis. Inom den universalistiska diskursen ses unionsmedborgarskapet 
som en allomfattande status och visionen är att därigenom tillförsäkras 
rättigheter till alla unionsmedborgare oavsett om de nyttjat rätten till fri 
rörlighet eller inte. Den alternativa diskursen beskriver unionsmed-
borgarskapet som “marknadsmedborgarskap”. I denna diskurs är EU främst 
en inre marknad, medan medlemsstaternas kompetens omfattar uppgiften att 
betrygga de grundläggande rättigheterna för de medborgare som inte är 
aktiva på den inre marknaden. 
 
Analysen av de senast tillkomna avgöranden från EU-domstolen tyder på att 
det mer restriktiva förhållningssättet till rättighetsdiskursen som framgått av 
Dereci fortsätter att dominera. 
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Abbreviations 
AG Advocate General 
 
Charter  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union 
 
EC  European Community   
 
EEC   European Economic Community  
 
ECHR  The Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
 
ECJ, Court  European Court of Justice 
 
ECtHR  European Court of Human Rights 
 
FRA  European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
 
SEA  Single European Act 
 
TCN  third-country national 
 
TEU  Treaty on European Union 
 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Introducing Union Citizenship 
When the legal concept of Union citizenship was first introduced in the 
Treaty of the European Union in 1992, few thought that the provisions 
would gain any notable significance beyond the symbolical. But through its 
case law, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has gradually developed a 
body of rights connected to the status of Union citizenship, with ‘cross-
border movement’ acting as a trigger.  
 
Notably, in a fascinating line of case law1 from 2011 onwards, the Court 
challenged its doctrine of ‘wholly internal situation’ and introduced a new 
EU law trigger test – that of ‘genuine appreciation of the substance of 
rights’. The meaning and implications of this line of case law have and 
continue to be debated intensively by scholars. Though interpretations vary, 
the critique is consistent in that it finds the Court's reasoning ambiguous and 
that it therefore could pose a threat to the coherence of EU law and thus on 
fairness and legal certainty. In the meantime, national courts are continuing 
to refer cases to the Court. A number of new cases2 have in fact been 
decided by the ECJ. In this paper, Against the background of the general 
debate on Union citizenship, I want to investigate whether these newest 
cases provide any further clarity to what is included in that ”substance” of 
rights. What exactly are the rights connected to European citizenship, as 
outlined by the Court?  
 
One of the recurrent themes in the critique of the case line is the lack of 
assessment of fundamental rights. When dealing with cases that are 
essentially about the right to family reunification or keeping a family 
together in the first place, it would seem intuitive to refer to the fundamental 
                                                
1  Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-01449 
Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi [2011] 
ECR I-01177 
Case C-434/09 Shirley McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2011] ECR I-3375 
Case C-256/11 Murat Dereci and others v Bundesministerium für Inneres 
[2012] ECR I-11315 
2 Case C-40/11 Yoshikazu Iida v Stadt Ulm [2012] judgment of 8 november  
2012; Joined cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O and S v 
Maahanmuuttovirasto; Maahanmuuttovirasto v L, judgment of 6 December 
2012 
Case C-87/12 Kreshnik Ymeraga and others v Ministre du Travail, de 
l’Emploi et de l’Immigration, judgment of 8 May 2013 
Case C-86/12 Alokpa and Moudoulou v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et 
de l’Immigration, judgment of 10 October 2013 
Case C-456/12 O. v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and 
Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v B., judgment of 12 March 
2014 
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right of the right to family life as a point of departure. However, though this 
assessment has been made by Advocate Generals in their Opinions3, the 
Court has been evasive. This is especially interesting considering the recent 
decades' debate on the need for fundamental rights to be reasserted in the 
Union, which ultimately resulted in the Charter of Fundamental Rights that 
entered into force with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. So the theme of 
fundamental rights is the special focus of this thesis.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the Court of Justice's newest case law 
in the field of Union citizenship against the background of Union citizenship 
at large, and with special focus on the question of fundamental rights. First I 
start with a short recap of the role of human rights in the history and today 
of European project. What are some of the problem points that are revealed 
in academic debate? Though huge steps have been taken in the last twenty 
years or so, there is also a counter-movement critiquing what is perceived as 
federalisation, from the part of the Member States and the general public. 
This has caused the Union to become weary of further steps toward 
integration, as was seen in the failed adaption of a European Constitution 
during the ‘00s. The delicate situation also translates into complications on 
the human rights front – what competence does the Court have in this area? 
As will be discussed in Chapter 2, the critique can be divided in roughly two 
camps: those who believe in a Union that should assert itself as a human 
rights regime, and those who prefer to see that the Union focuses on its core 
activity, which is perfecting the internal market. I argue in this thesis that 
this division line also exists in the academic debate regarding the case law 
on Union citizenship, and is an explanatory factor for the Court's ambivalent 
decisions in this field.  
 
 
1.2 Methodological Premises 
This study has traditional legal method as its methodological starting point. 
This term indicates the study and resolution of a legal problem through the 
study of sources of law in accordance with the hierarchy of norms4.  The 
object of study is the normative system of laws, not the societal reality that 
it leads to when authorities and lower level courts apply it. In accordance 
with this, my material is limited to primarily ECJ case law and Opinions of 
Advocate Generals and secondly legal doctrine. The role of legal doctrine is 
to provide a wider view of the field of law, and thus point out ambiguities in 
the Court's legal reasoning and also criticize case law5. But in order to reach 
a deeper understanding of the question on hand, one must have knowledge 
of the wider socio-political context. This wider context can for example 
provide explanation to the inconsistencies in the sources of law on hand6.  
                                                
3 See for example Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion in Ruiz Zambrano  
 paras 151-177. 
4 Kleineman in Zamboni & Korling p. 37. 
5 ibid p. 34. 
6 ibid p. 23. 
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But the choice of traditional legal method does not mean that one cannot 
have a critical perspective on the law, quite the contrary.   
 
That said, more than what is the case in traditional legal method, the 
conviction in this thesis is that law (and the study of law) is political in the 
sense that it is a system that legitimises and reinforces a political regime. 
This legitimisation takes place in subtle ways, through cognitive 
constructions known as discourses.  Discourses are socially produced forms 
of knowledge that set limits upon what it is possible to think, write or speak 
about a given social object or practice. It is typical that one form of speaking 
of a phenomenon becomes dominating, which makes it difficult to establish 
an alternative set of references in thought. They are powerful fictions 
dressed as truths. Calling something a discourse means putting its truth into 
question7.  
 
The background to these paradigms is to be found in power and dependency 
relations. Instead of seeking the answer to ”what is law” and from there on 
try to derive more or less sure solutions, here the focus is on ”how” the law 
is constructed, and how solutions to legal problems are legitimized.  
 
Therefore, the contribution of a discursive approach is that it reveals that 
traditional legal analysis possibly hides multifaceted, even conflicted, 
discourses, instead promoting a solution that the author either personally 
believes in ”or is bought to support8. As the presentation of the legal 
literature discussing the Ruiz Zambrano case line will indicate, there is not 
one coherent, grand narrative of the EU polity, but several contradictory 
ones. A postmodern approach to legal study can be helpful in revealing this, 
where traditional doctrinal legal research struggles in finding coherence 
where it might not exist at all.  
 
Specifically, in this thesis, the position is that a main question that affects 
my material (the judgments) is conflicting notions of what the European 
Union is as a polity. Or to use the words of postmodern legal study9, there is 
not one “Grand Narrative” of Europe but several conflicting narratives. 
 
The point of departure here is that the notion of ”Union citizenship” can 
carry different meanings, depending on the frame of context that it is placed 
in. In the reading of the academic discussion concerning union citizenship 
and the Ruiz Zambrano case line two conflicting framings, or discourses, of 
citizenship are identified - one of a market actor (market citizen), and one 
which embodies that which we traditionally associate with citizenship- such 
as identity and political rights.  
 
There is, of course, no citizenship without a polity, and the argument here is 
that inconsistency in the ECJ's rulings on ‘the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of the rights’ doctrine is due to there being two competing 
                                                
7 Bacchi, p. 35. 
8 Andersson in Zamboni & Korling p. 347. 
9  ibid p. 345. 
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paradigms of what the role of the Union is: to safeguard and advance the 
internal market, or to become a ”deeper” polity than that. In Nic Shuibhne’s 
words, there is a built-in ambiguity with the EU as a polity: the Union is 
founded on the principle of conferred powers10 but it is also committed 
through primary law and case law to protecting the rights of its citizens11.  
 
The prevailing market rationality has been characterized as a form of 
neoliberal governmentality, which has dominated the EU project since its 
start12. In the specific case of citizenship, this concept, which is traditionally 
associated with identity and politics more than economy has been vested to 
the interests of the internal market. Brännström also points out that though 
the neoliberal notion of government as primarily serving a market was 
entrenched in the Community from its start, it was a weak notion which left 
room for alternative notions of governance, like a social one. But these 
alternative notions have gradually been put under extensive pressure, 
notably through the ECJ's case law.  
 
 
1.3 A Word on ”Rights” 
The approach to rights discourses in this thesis is one of “Foucaultian 
scepticism”13: claims of rights always exist in a landscape of power 
relations.  Rights are a social construction. This is in contrast to a ”natural 
rights” discourse, where the premise is that rights are freestanding, installed 
upon every individual independently of the prevailing political regime.  
 
Rights are, to use a phrase of Gayatri Spivak, something ”that we cannot not 
want”14. The ”righteousness” of rights is incontestable. Thus, framing 
political goals in a rights discourse is a way of making those goals 
incontestable. At the same time, rights are a driver of segregation, as the 
degree of empowerment that rights bring to different social groups depends 
on the social resources available to them plus their degree of social 
vulnerability when exercising those rights15.  
 
Following this line of thought in the context of the European project, the 
concrete use of rights in EU law and ECJ jurisprudence is discussed in the 
following section. This discussion exemplifies the argument of a rights 
language used as a strengthening agent in an essentially political discourse, 
ie the language of rights functioning as a tool for legitimisation of the 
political project that the Union essentially is.  
 
 
                                                
10  See section 1.5. 
11  Nic Shuibhne 2013 p. 131. 
12 See for example Leila Brännströms analysis, Brännström 2014. 
13  Patton in Golder & Fitzpatrick, pp. 460-476. 
14  cited in Brown 2000 p. 130. 
15  Brown 2000 pp. 130-131. 
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1.4 The Language of Rights in EU Law 
 
The language of rights used in the context of EU law has been deemed 
ambiguous. The following is an attempt to illustrate the use of the various 
terms.  
 
The term human rights appears quite rarely in the EU law, usually when 
referring to international human rights conventions, specifically the 
European Convention of Human Rights16. According to Art 6(1) TEU,  
 
”The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are 
common to the Member States.”  
 
Instead, the term fundamental rights appears more frequently. Art 6(2) TEU 
states:  
 
”The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in 
Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as 
general principles of Community law. ” 
 
It is apparent from the wording of Art 6(2) TEU that fundamental rights is 
to be understood as a broader notion than human rights, including not only 
rights recognized in international human rights documents (above all 
ECHR), but also in constitutions of the Member States of the EU. It has 
been claimed that fundamental rights are more commonly used in 
constitutional law than human rights17. This could possibly be explained by 
the idea of human rights as universal to all of humanity, whereas 
fundamental rights exist within the realm of the constitution, and thus are 
linked to the notion of citizenship, which, as will be discussed later on, on 
its part carries a dichotomy of inclusion/exclusion instead of universality.  
 
According to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), 
the term fundamental rights is used in European Union to express the 
concept of human rights within a specific EU internal context. Traditionally, 
the term fundamental rights is used in a constitutional setting whereas the 
term human rights is used in international law. The two terms refer to 
similar substance as can be seen when comparing the content in the Charter 
                                                
16 De Witte in Alston et al. p. 860. 
17 ibid p. 860. 
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of Fundamental Rights of the European Union with that of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter.18  
Fundamental rights in the EU law context are a sub-category of general 
principles of EU Law guiding the interpretation of EU law19. The common 
denominator is that they either are described by the language of rights and 
freedoms, or otherwise traditionally form a part of human rights documents 
and constitutional rights catalogues. Examples of the latter are the principles 
of equality and non-discrimination20.  
Finally, fundamental freedoms is a specifically in EU law existing notion for 
the common market freedoms (free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital), which have a quasi-rights character. These freedoms, 
particularly free movement of persons, have been important carriers of 
individual rights, oftentimes challenging national legal and constitutional 
provisions21. The exercise of fundamental freedoms is not unlimited – the 
main limitation to their scope is the ”purely internal situation”, which means 
that a cross-border link has to be established. 
Trstenjak has identified a gradual expansion of the respective scope of 
application is a common trait in both the ECJ case law on fundamental 
freedoms and rights, and at the same time the rights and the freedoms are 
increasingly overlapping22. This blurring has been criticized for conflating 
fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights, which arguably diminishes 
the gravitas of fundamental rights23. The question has been raised if in fact a 
conflict between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms can be seen 
as a conflict between two equally fundamental ”constitutional” principles24? 
The argument, which is based on a natural rights discourse, is that 
fundamental rights are understood to exist and be available to every person, 
regardless of codification. They are not granted but rather recognized in 
legal documents25. Free movement rights on the other hand are economic in 
nature, derived from the Treaty, and would thus not exist outside the realm 
of the Treaty26. They are thus instruments for the political project of 
European integration. But when the Court performs a balancing act between 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms, it follows that fundamental 
rights must be justified in the context of economic freedoms, thus 
potentially deflating the status of the fundamental rights while promoting 
fundamental freedoms27. By promoting Treaty-based fundamental freedoms 
                                                
18 http://fra.europa.eu/en/about-fundamental-rights/frequently-asked- 
 questions#difference-human-fundamental-rights 
19 de Vries p. 169. 
20 de Witte p. 861. 
21 de Witte p. 863, see also de Vries p. 176. 
22  Trstenjak 2013 pp. 293-315. 
23 de Witte p. 861. 
24 de Vries p. 175. 
25 Spaventa p. 355. 
26 De Vries p. 177. 
27 De Vries s. 187, see also Spaventa   
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to the status of fundamental rights, arguably the Court is promoting itself for 
monopoly at resolving these conflicts28. As Spaventa points out, a court 
which fails to articulate its own discourse, risks delegitimising itself and 
moving into the domain of pure politics29. This increasing blurring the 
distinctions between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms is 
especially pronounced in the context of Union Citizenship30.  
 
 
 
1.5 On the Study of EU Law 
 
A main specificity of the EU legal order follows from the the principle of 
conferral31, which denotes that the EU is a union of Member States, and all 
its competences are voluntarily conferred on it by its Member States. Thus 
any areas of policy not explicitly agreed in treaties remain the domain of the 
Member States. The central, and challenging activity of the Court of Justice 
is defining the scope of EU law, and thus its own jurisdiction. The 
introduction of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, with Article 51 in 
particular, has caused tension and placed a demand for the Court to give 
guidance on the interpretation of the provision. As we will see onward, the 
definition of the scope in the form of wholly internal situation is decisive for 
the case law regarding Union citizenship. While the raison-d'etre of this 
purely internal rule has been questioned, not least because of the situation of 
reverse-discrimination which it creates for citizens who have not exercised 
their free movement rights, it does serve a purpose in the context of the 
principle of conferral. The rationale for the purely internal rule in early free 
movement case law was to include within the scope of EU law on the 
fundamental freedoms only those situations that were sufficiently connected 
with the intrinsic aims underpinning those freedoms. Now that the aims of 
the Union have evolved from purely economic ones, the identification of 
aims to which the Court must refer in order to delimit the scope of Union 
law is under challenge32. 
 
Any student of EU law will be aware of the ECJ's alleged role as a ”maker” 
of EU law, and also of the debate of the activist court. After all, the ECJ has 
a constitutional responsibility – that is a responsibility to protect and further 
the objectives and values enshrined in the Treaties. In Nic Shuibhnes words, 
the ECJ seeks to make law by shaping the scope of EU law through a series 
of principles, concepts and tests developed and applied by the Court when it 
interprets and applies the Treaty provisions, a competence which it derives 
from art 19 TEU33. This activity has sometimes been frowned upon.  In the 
                                                
28 Spaventa p. 363. 
29 Spaventa p. 363. 
30  Besson & Utzinger pp. 577-578. 
31 Art 5 TEU. 
32 See O'Leary in Dougan & Nic Shuibhne p. 39.  
33 Nic Shuibhne 2013 pp. 8-21. 
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specific context of Union citizenship, it has been argued that the Court uses 
the symbolically powerful concept of citizenship, sometimes in conjunction 
to human rights arguments, in order to justify some of its more daring 
judgments on free movement and the single market34. 
 
A challenge that the student of EU law faces is the specific nature of the 
preliminary ruling procedure – which is also the setting for the cases on 
hand in this thesis. The Court needs to separate the facts and the law, and 
articulate its resolution on the level of workable principle, however letting 
the national court do the resolution on hand whilst they have the question of 
EU law cleared out. This is sometimes easier said than done, as is illustrated 
in the academic review of the Ruiz Zambrano case line.  
 
 
1.6 Delimitations 
 
As mentioned before, the broad theme of this thesis is the “problem” of 
fundamental rights in the European project, especially after the changes that 
came into force with the Charter. This is obviously too large of an ambition 
for a master’s thesis. Instead, my aim is to bring a new perspective on this 
theme through an analysis of union citizenship case law. 
 
The main subject in this thesis is, as noted earlier, the specific exception to 
the prevailing cross-border requirement that is the “substance of rights 
connected to Union citizenship”, which flows from primary law. Thus, 
though secondary law in the form of Directive 2004/3835 is assessed in all of 
the cases under analysis, this falls outside the core subject matter and will be 
dealt with more summarily.  
 
Regarding the choice of case law for analysis in Chapter 5, while the 
ambition is to cover all the newest judgments, the Ymeraga case is omitted, 
as it does not provide any novel formulations in respect to the other cases 
cited. This is in order to avoid monotonous repetitiveness, as the case 
mostly repeats formulations from previous cases.  
 
Finally, there are some methodological limitations that follow from the 
choice of focusing on case law. Firstly, case law is to its nature an uneven 
method of law-making, as courts are forced to resolve the disputes or 
answer the questions that are placed in front of them, even if these are not 
necessarily the questions that further the coherence of case law in the best 
way36.  The attempt in legal doctrine is to try to find coherence where there 
really not might be any. To make the claim to uncover the intent of a court 
                                                
34 Shaw in Craigh and de Burca p. 582. 
35  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29  
 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members  
 to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 
36 Nic Schuibhne 2013 p. 10. 
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through only a few judgments is also risky. It is doubtful if a court like the 
ECJ, which constitutes of several chambers, can even be claimed to have 
one distinguished stance37.  
 
 
1.7 Thesis Questions 
 
What narratives of the European Union as a polity can be detected in the 
Union citizenship and fundamental rights debates of the recent years? 
 
How (if in any way) are fundamental rights assessed in the new judgments –
as in which language of rights is used? How is the “problem” of 
fundamental rights represented in this newest case law- as a question of 
proper delimitation of competences or as a question of all-encompassing, 
universal human rights? 
 
What representations of citizenship are conveyed in the newest judgments 
and the Advocate Generals’ Opinions? 
 
 
1.8 Outline 
In Chapter 2, a short recap of the history of fundamental rights in the 
context of the European integration project will be presented. This is 
obviously only superficial, the aim being to identify key debates, and 
conflicting discourses that are reflected in academic literature. This 
background serves to understand the debates concerning Union citizenship. 
In Chapter 3, an introduction to the legal landscape of Union citizenship is 
presented, along with an assessment of some of the critical voices on the 
concept. Chapter 4 introduces the true subject of this thesis, the ‘substance 
of rights’ doctrine, as it is revealed in the ECJ’s case law. This is, as we will 
see, an exception to the Court’s requirement for a cross-border connection.  
In Chapter 5, the newest cases will be presented and analysed. Chapter 6 
pulls the strings together – where do we stand now? Which notion of the 
citizen is prevailing, and which rights are deemed worthy of protection? 
 
                                                
37 Nic Schuibhne 2013 p. 6 
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2 Fundamental Rights and 
the European Union 
2.1 Historical Background 
The traditional narrative of the evolution of human rights protection in the 
European Union describes a one-sided emphasis on economic cooperation 
and the creation of a common market, whereas the importance of 
fundamental rights for the EEC Treaty and for the EU as a polity came 
about only later. However, there are signs already in the preliminary works 
leading to the EEC Treaty that reveal the significance that was given to 
human rights protection in the European Economic Cooperation38, though it 
was agreed that the European Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights (ECHR) would be the authoritative source of the European Political 
Community's human rights system39. The human rights provisions had 
however been removed in the final draft of the EEC Treaty.  This was due to 
some Member States wanting a less ”supranational” approach40, instead 
preferring the national courts to act as the protectors of fundamental rights 
even against possible unlawful intrusion from the Community41.  
 
But with the ECJ developing the supremacy doctrine in the 1960s42, this 
division of competences became increasingly problematic. From the 1970s 
onward, the Community's regulatory powers were challenged by German 
litigants who invoked domestically granted constitutional rights in national 
courts, forcing the ECJ to subsequently recognize the role of fundamental 
rights in the EU legal order43.  The Court thus ”discovered” fundamental 
rights, as they manifested themselves in the common constitutional 
traditions of the Member States and the conventions on which they 
collaborated, as part of the general principles in EU law44. It has been 
claimed that the driving force for this ”discovery” of fundamental rights in 
the EU legal order was to protect the supremacy of Community law from 
rejection in national courts45. Subsequently, the case law of the ECJ 
addressing human rights issues expanded, and various legal and political 
                                                
38 de Búrca in Craigh & de Búrca pp. 465-497. 
39 ibid p. 486. 
40 ibid p. 474. 
41 de Witte in Alston p. 863 
42 Case 6/64 Flamino Costa v. E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 585 
43 Case 29/69 Erich Stauder v. Stadt Ulm-Sozialamt [1969] ECR 419 
 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und  
 Vorratsstelle Getreide [1970] ECR 1125; Case 4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und  
 Baustoffgrosshandlung v Commission of the European Communities [1974]  
 ECR 491   
44 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft para 4, now codified in art 6(3) TEU. 
45 de Witte in Alston p. 866. 
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initiatives were taken to develop a more active role for human rights within 
EU law and policy46.  
 
With regards to sources of law, human rights found their way into treaty 
texts only in the Maastricht Treaty, though the preamble of the Single 
European Act (SEA) in 1987 had made a mention of human rights.  In the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, formal recognition was finally given to human 
rights as part of EU law. These amendments gave official affirmation to the 
case law of the ECJ, and thus marked a ”constitutional coming-of-age of 
human rights within the EU legal framework47. 
 
According to Spaventa, this process can be seen as one of the most tangible 
effects of the constitutional development of the European integration 
project. Fundamental rights rhetoric has served to legitimize the expansion 
of Union competences. The idea of drafting a Charter of Fundamental 
Rights is to be seen against this background, as a legitimization of the 
Union's evolvement from merely a common market to a more mature polity 
with its own foreign policy, cooperation in criminal matters and so forth48.  
 
Whereas the ambition to consolidate the EU Constitution was a main point 
on the agenda for much of the 00's, the Charter only gained binding status in 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The delay was due to an increasingly negative 
opinion amongst the general European public against what was perceived to 
be an elite project, a turbulence that culminated in the negative referendum 
results in France and Netherlands for the treaty establishing the European 
Constitution.  
 
 
2.2 Fundamental Rights in the Current 
Sources of EU Law 
Currently the main formal sources for EU human rights are listed in Article 
6 TEU: these are the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which has the same 
legal value as the Treaties, and ‘general principles of EU law’ which include 
fundamental rights as guaranteed by ECHR and flowing from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.  
 
The Charter is to be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in 
Articles 51 to 54 of the Charter. Thus, according to Article 52(1) of the 
Charter, the exercise of rights and freedoms provided by the said document 
may be subject to limitations on the conditions that they are provided by the 
law and that the limitations are necessary and proportionate.  
 
                                                
46 de Búrca in Craigh & de Búrca pp. 479-480. 
47 ibid p. 481. 
48 Spaventa pp. 346-347. 
 15 
2.3 The EU and ECHR 
 
The Lisbon Treaty also introduced an obligation for the EU to accede to the 
ECHR49.   Until this happens, the Convention is not formally binding on the 
EU, though the contrary has also been argued50. The ECJ treats the ECHR 
as a source of inspiration rather than a formally binding bill of rights51, 
which also has meant that the Court has seen it fitting to go beyond the 
protection granted by the ECHR see, for example, below for discussion 
regarding Metock case, where a violation to fundamental right was seen as a 
breach to free movement right. A human rights conflict with a cross-border 
link is therefore in some cases more likely to have a favourable outcome for 
the individual than a purely internal situation52. The idea of the Convention 
as a floor instead of a ceiling is now codified in Article 52(3) of the Charter, 
which states that ”this provision shall not prevent the Union law providing 
more extensive protection”. 
 
 
2.4 Limiting the Scope of the Charter 
 
Article 6(1)2 TEU states that the provisions of the Charter shall not extend 
in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties. 
 
According to Article 51(1) of the Charter, it only applies to acts of Member 
States when they implement EU law. Also, according to Article 51(2), no 
new task or power has been created by its adaption. Regarding the first 
point, it has been unclear whether the provision should be interpreted 
literally, which would mean that the scope of the application of the Charter 
is less than the scope of the application of the general principles of EU law, 
which bind the Member States when they are acting within the scope of EU 
law53. Somewhat confusingly, the Explanations to the Charter state that it 
binds “Member States when they act within the scope of Union law”54. 
However, with the Åkerberg Fransson ruling55 it was clarified that the 
Charter does not restrict the scope of EU fundamental rights. But it is still 
unclear what connection to EU law is actually required in order to trigger 
the application of Charter rights56.  
                                                
49 Art 6(2) TEU 
50 see Craigh and de Burca 2011  p. 381 footnote 117 for a references to a 
contrary argument.  
51 ibid pp. 366-367. 
52 Iliopoulou p. 29. 
53  according to Case C-260/89 ERT [1993] ECR I-2925. 
54  Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, O.J. 2007,  
C 303/17. 
55  Case C-617/10. Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, judgment of the  
 Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 February 2013, nyr 
56  Hancox p. 1430 
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These provisions are to be seen as an insistent ambition from the part of 
Member States to restrict the extent to which the EU can monitor and affect 
their policies57. The Member States’ approach to advancing the EU as a 
human rights regime seems equivocal – whenever a potential expansion in 
this field is agreed upon, there seems to be a counteraction from the part of 
the member state governments. The question how the provision in Article  
51 of the Charter will play out in practice is by no means resolved.  
 
2.5 The Right to Respect for Family 
Life 
 
Due to the delimitation of this thesis, a short presentation of the fundamental 
right that is actualized in the cases that are under analysis, namely the right 
to respect for family life, will follow. The right to respect for family life is 
codified in art 7 of the Charter: 
 
”Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private 
and family life, home and communications.” 
 
The right to respect for family life was first recognized as a general 
principle of EU law in Carpenter58, which concerned the application of 
Directive 2004/38.  The Court held that the deportation from the home state 
of the third-country national spouse of a service provider would be 
detrimental to their family life and therefore to the conditions under which 
the service provider exercised a fundamental freedom. While Member States 
might invoke reasons of public interest to justify such a deportation 
decision, this decision had to be compatible with the fundamental rights, 
including the service provider's right to respect for his family life59. In the 
Metock case, the Court found that the refusal of a Member State to grant a 
right to entry and residence to a TCN family member of an EU national 
discourages EU nationals from using their free movement rights, even if 
marriage took place after the Union citizen exercised his right of free 
movement60. In other words, a violation of human rights is framed as an 
obstacle to free movement61, which is not entirely uncontroversial – 
recalling discussion on the conflation fundamental rights vs. fundamental 
freedoms in section 1.4.  
 
                                                
57 de Búrca in Craigh & de Búrca p. 485, see also Craigh & de Búrca 2011 p.  
 393. 
58  Case C-60/00 Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department  
 [2002] ECR I-6279. 
59 Carpenter paras 39-45. 
60  Case C-127/08 Metock v. Minister for Justice [2008] ECR I-6241 paras 87- 
 93. 
61 Iliopoulou in Dougan and Nic Schuibhne p. 29;  O'Leary in Craigh and de 
 Búrca p. 541. 
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O'Leary suggests that these cases are examples of the transformation of the 
EEC's and EC's objectives in the field of free movement from purely or 
principally economic objectives to ones influenced by social and 
humanitarian concerns. Earlier case law had been decided with reference to 
the dynamics of internal market and free movement, whereas these cases 
showcased the increased importance accorded to the protection of the right 
to respect for family life as an independent right of EU nationals and as 
itself and objective of the free movement rules62.  
 
 
2.6 EU and Fundamental Rights – 
Problem Points 
The Court has so far not clearly stated which human rights violations are to 
be considered as obstacles to free movement. This forms part of the more 
general uncertainty surrounding the exact scope of ECJ's competence 
regarding fundamental rights protection63. In the name of coherence, it could 
be argued64 that all violations of fundamental rights should be defined as 
breaches of free movement. The opposing voices argue that the ECJ should 
exercise restraint in this area, and that ”only serious and persistent violations 
which highlight a problem of systemic nature in the protection of 
fundamental rights in the Member State at issue, would qualify as violations 
of the rules on free movement, by virtue of the direct threat they would pose 
to the transnational dimension of European citizenship and integrity of the 
EU legal order65.  
 
Nic Shuibhne identifies the realisation of fundamental rights as one of 
central drivers in the fragmentation of the ECJ’s free movement case law. 
The balancing between the ambition to protect vulnerable individuals, and 
the binding constitutional constrictions codified in the Charter and the TEU 
demonstates how the protection of fundamental rights can be source of 
fragmentation66.  
 
Without a doubt, it is obvious that the relationship between EU law and 
fundamental rights is one of the most challenging questions to be settled in 
the light of the growing expansion of EU competences, the now legally 
binding Charter and the EU's scheduled accession to the ECHR, and the fact 
that the convention rights constitute general principles of EU law67.  
 
                                                
62 O'Leary in Craigh and de Búrca pp. 542-543 
63 Iliopoulou in Dougan and Nic Shuibhne p. 31. 
64 As Iliopoulou does p. 31 onwards. 
65 AG Maduro in Centro Europa 7 Srl para 22 
66  Nic Schuibhne 2013 p. 51. 
67  Wiesbrock p. 869. 
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As a conclusion, there seems to be a paradox beset in the assessment of 
fundamental rights within the European Union68. It is not a question of 
which rights deserve to be protected, but where this protection, and the 
balancing of conflicting rights, most aptly should take place – at a domestic 
or a supranational level69. A concrete example of this is the ambivalence 
surrounding Article 51 of the Charter.  
 
In the long run, this ambivalence is really about the ethos of the Union itself 
– while there is no doubt that the original aim was to create a union of 
economic cooperation in order to promote peace and affluence within 
Europe, there are differing opinions, or competing discourses of where the 
focus in the cooperation should be placed: on perfecting the internal market, 
which is relatively uncontroversial today, or if the Union should aim to be 
”a mature and comprehensive constitutional system70” and a true 
international human rights regime. This controversy is especially true in an 
age of growing anti-EU sentiment: not being overtly ambitious seems like a 
safer bet. These competing discourses translate into discrepancies in the ECJ 
case law regarding fundamental rights, including those that are connected to 
Union citizenship. After all, a fundamental rights discourse serves a 
legitimizing function, at whichever level it is placed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
68 See also Alston and Weiler, p. 6-7. 
69 Spaventa p. 343. 
70 Spaventa p. 344. 
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3 Union Citizenship 
3.1 The Legal Landscape of Union 
Citizenship 
 
The current Treaty provisions on Union citizenship are to be found in 
Articles 20-25 TFEU. Article 20 TFEU contains an inexhaustive list of the 
rights and duties conferred to Union citizens by the Treaties, including the 
right of residence and movement. These rights are subjected to limitations 
and restrictions provided by the Treaties. Article 20(2) a-d guarantees the 
right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 
and political rights and a right to diplomatic and consular protection. The 
provisions of Articles 21-25 TFEU elaborate the rights summarized in 
Article 20(2)a-d. Article 21 elaborates the right to move and reside freely, 
subjecting it to limitations and conditions provided by the Treaties and by 
secondary law.  
 
Case law71 has confirmed that the rights of movement and residence 
provided by Art 20 & 21 TFEU are directly effective, and independent of 
other legal status categories under Union law. Limitations on these rights 
imposed by Member States must be proportionate so that their exercise is 
not limited in a disproportionate manner.   
 
 
3.1.1 The Hierarchy of European Citizenship 
 
EU citizenship is contingent to the possession of a national citizenship of a 
Member State. The EU has no competence to decide who is a citizen.  That 
competence belies with the individual Member States. Citizenship is 
”additional” to Member State nationality72. “Additional” replaced the 
previously used “complementary” in the Lisbon Treaty, possibly suggesting 
that Union citizenship can provide rights that are more than just 
complementary to those connected to national citizenship73.  
 
A number of cases seem to suggest that the status of citizenship remains 
residual to other existing legal status categories such as worker, service 
provider/recipient and the like, based on economic activity, and that the 
citizenship concept functions as an extra enhancer for pre-existing rights 
under Union law74. 
                                                
71  Referred to in the section 3.2. 
72 Art 20.1 TFEU. 
73  Currie in Dougan & Currie p. 388. 
74 See Craigh & de Burca pp. 846-847 for case references. 
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3.2 The Evolution of EU Citizenship 
 
Although Union citizenship was only officially introduced in the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, the concept of European citizenship itself dates back to the 
1970's, when first references in policy texts were made to ”a Europe for 
citizens”, with suggestions for enhancing the integration of Community 
nationals living in other Member States than their own. During that era the 
Court started supporting its judgments on free movement provisions by 
referring to individual free movement rights of European citizens75. The 
thinner notion of market citizenship was present from the start of the EEC, 
in the traditional ”economic” free movement provisions, and enforced by 
classic rulings such as Van Gend and Loos76.  
 
Citizenship of the Union is perceived to have two main objectives, of which 
the first is to protect the individual and strengthen his or her rights. 
Secondly, it aims at giving the Union a more state-like appearance, by 
creating a polity in which the citizens can participate77. Thus, ”a direct 
political link is created between the citizens and the Union, with the aim of 
fostering a sense of identity with the Union”78. As such, the development of 
the concept of citizenship is also connected to the more general aim of 
increasing the democratic legitimacy of the Union.  One suggestion is that 
Union citizenship is about encouraging ”multiple membership”, that is 
individuals' rights to not only belong to their home state, based on 
nationality, but also the host state, based on residence79. Union citizenship 
as conveyed in the ECJ case law is transnational in character, not post-
national80. 
 
For a long time it seemed that not much of practical significance would 
come out of provisions on Union citizenship81. This was the understanding 
even though the ECJ early on made the claim that Union citizenship is 
”destined to become the fundamental status of the citizens of the European 
Union82. What weight is to be put into this claim is unclear.  Some have 
described this statement as ”aspirational”83, suggesting the possibility of EU 
citizenship entirely independent of the cross-border connection that has 
traditionally been required in order for the ECJ to have jurisdiction84.  
During the years, the legal concept of Union citizenship has appeared in a 
                                                
75 See Currie in Dougan & Currie p. 367 for references. 
76 In Van Gend and Loos para 12 , the Court stated that ”the Community  
 constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which  
 the States have limited their sovereign rights... and the subjects of which  
 comprise not only Member States but also their nationals”. 
77 Bernitz & Lokrantz Bernitz in Alston p. 512. 
78 The Commission's Report on Citizenship of the Union (COM(93)702. 
79 Iliopoloulou in Dougan & Nic Shuibhne. 
80 Shaw in Craigh & de Burca p. 586. 
81 See for example Bernitz & Lokrantz Bernitz in Alston pp. 524-525. 
82 First stated in the Grzelczyk case, (para 31) and repeated thereafter.  
83 Currie in Dougan & Currie p. 365, Shaw in Craigh & de Búrca p. 576. 
84 See for example Kochenov 2013 p. 508. 
 21 
number of judgments, expanding and enhancing the rights of movement, 
residence and other social rights to non-economically active citizens and 
other categories of citizens who are not protected by pre-existing Union 
rights, as long as they do not constitute an unreasonable burden to the host 
state. It can without a doubt be said the first and foremost right connected to 
EU citizenship is the right to move and reside freely. Through its case law 
regarding Directive 2004/38 and its predecessors the ECJ has confirmed that 
Article 20(1) TFEU confers a directly effective right of residence on EU 
citizens independently of any other existing EU status category, as long as a 
cross-border dimension can be established85. Limitations that a Member 
State may impose on these rights must not constitute ”a disproportionate 
interference with the exercise of the fundamental right of freedom of 
movement and residence upheld by the article in question.86”. Interestingly, 
when it comes to the right to family life, the Court ruled that a refusal to 
grant a right of residence to the parent, whether an EU or a third country 
national, and enjoying sufficient resources and health insurance, ”would 
deprive the child's right of residence to any useful effect”87.  
 
On the other hand, the Court has also repeatedly insisted that EU citizenship 
was not intended to enlarge the material scope of EU law88. This statement 
has raised eyebrows among scholars. Kochenov sees it as symptomatic of 
the Court's uncertainty about the meaning and contents of Union 
citizenship89.  
 
As a summary, the development during the last two decades in the legal 
status of Union citizenship have fundamentally altered the position of 
economically inactive migrants, and has shaped the interpretation of free 
movement provisions, a development which has been driven by the ECJ. 
But in the same time, it is far from constituting a fundamental status for all 
nationals of Member States, having relevance only for the minority of 
Union citizens that have exercised their free movement rights.  
 
 
3.3 EU Citizenship and the ”Wholly 
Internal Situation” 
 
The ECJ has repeatedly ruled that ”wholly internal situations” fall beyond 
the scope of EU law and EU law thus cannot be invoked on restrictions to 
free movement within a Member State. But the ECJ has also identified an 
increasing amount of situations with a cross-border element, where true 
                                                
85 Baumbast, confirmed in Zhu and Chen. 
86 Zhu and Chen para 33. 
87 Zhu and Chen para 45. 
88 Uecker and Jaquet, Garcia Avello. 
89 Kochenov 2013 p. 508. 
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movement is ”either barely discernable or frankly non-existent...”90, in 
rulings which sometimes have been criticized for being non-intuitive and 
quite contrived91. There has also been pressure on the ECJ to rethink its 
stance on the ”wholly internal situation”, not least because of the situation 
of reverse discrimination which it gives rise to, and which according to 
critics92 sits uneasily with ”citizenship” – a notion which is commonly 
understood to be a rights-bearer, providing equal rights for all citizens.  
Instead the current situation is that a human rights conflict with a 
transnational dimension will be likely to have a more favourable outcome 
for the individual than if he or she were in purely internal situation93.  
 
 
3.4 A Thin Notion of Citizenship 
 
There is no shortage of critique toward the notion of Union citizenship. The 
focus here will be on the concept lacking the depth that is traditionally 
associated with citizenship. In the words of Nic Shuibhne, “the legal, 
political and social threads of EU citizenship are not sufficiently joined 
up”94.  Political citizenship in the Union is still very weak, though attempts 
have been made to strengthen it. While political rights have been lacking, 
The ECJ has gradually taken the Union from market citizenship toward a 
form of social citizenship. But traditionally, to qualify within the personal 
scope of Union law, the main rule is that one has to in show a sufficient 
connection to the internal market, in the form of a cross-border 
connection95. The cross-border requirement embedded in the market 
citizenship notion still makes Union citizenship irrelevant for most Union 
citizens, who are static96.   
 
The question is what the proper locus for developing the contents of Union 
citizenship is to be placed. The prohibition of restrictions to fundamental 
freedoms has already curtailed the autonomy of Member States97. The 
political and social deficits affecting the Union broadly should be a sign for 
                                                
90 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano para 77 
91 See for example Nic Schuibhne 2013. 
92  See for example AG Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano, referred in 4.1.2. 
93  Iliopoulou in Dougan & Nic Schuibhne p. 29. 
94  Nic Shuibhne: ”Editorial: three paradoxes of EU citizenship” 2010 35 EL  
 rev 1 p. 130. 
95  Besson & Utzinger p. 586. Wollenschläger points at a gradual loosening of  
 the nexus between free movement and market integration due to the  
 inclusion of economically inactive persons in the free movement regime in  
 ECJ case law, pp. 10-14. 
96  For example Shaw in Craigh & de Búrca p. 597. 
97  Wollenschläger p. 15. 
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the Court to back off98. Others argue the opposite, that progressive case law 
is needed in order to take Union citizenship to a new level99.  
 
As citizenship is additional to national citizenship, and does not replace it, it 
has been questioned what aim it really serves. Instead of creating a new 
fundamental entity of supra-national character, Union citizenship only 
enforces national citizenship. A preferable condition of inclusion could be 
legal residence in the Union100.  
 
The notion of Union citizenship is built on the idea of enabling the common 
market by guaranteeing mobility rights for workers. This is a thin notion of 
citizenship compared to the depth and breath usually associated with 
national citizenship101. Citizenship is a tool aimed at enhancing the 
legitimacy of the Union and as such an elite project102.   
 
Others have a more pragmatic approach, arguing that citizenship requires a 
polity, and the common market is the by now uncontested essence of the 
European project103. Iliopoulou offers a pragmatic motivation for the focus 
on the internal market: After Union citizenship was introduced in the 
Treaties, the Court took inspiration from its own case law on economic 
movement on the internal market, which was more robust. Thus, concepts 
designed specifically in relation to the economic freedoms were transposed 
to the field of Union citizenship law104.  The drawback of this approach is 
that the Union citizen is a subsidiary character compared to economic 
agents, an idea which fits uneasily with the declared ambition of becoming 
the fundamental status.  
 
The tendency toward market citizenship has been the object of a feminist 
critique.  It focuses on securing rights to economically active individuals 
who use free movement rights to enter Member States and access economic 
benefits while there. Women are generally in disadvantage in such an 
equation, because they, more often than men, participate in non-economic 
activities such as caring. While the EU citizen only exists in the public 
sphere, the unequal division of labour in the private sphere also produces 
unequal opportunities in the public sphere105.  
 
The EU idea of solidarity within society is more individualistic than the 
traditional welfare state system that is prevalent in many Member States, a 
system which is based on the logic of collective redistribution. The ECJ case 
law regarding free movement increases the emphasis of economical 
                                                
98  Nic Shuibhne: ”The Resilience of Market Citizenship”, CML 47: 1597- 
 1628, 2010. 
99  The main proponent for this approach is Kochenov. 
100 See for example Kochenov 2013 for this argument.  
101  Askola p. 344. 
102 Currie in Dougan & Currie p. 367. 
103 Nic Schuibhne 2010. 
104 Iliopoulou in Dougan & Nic Shuibhne p. 15-16. 
105 Askola p. 344. 
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contribution as a condition of citizenship106. Though as we saw earlier, 
rights have been extended to non-economically active citizens, it can be 
argued that these are the exceptions that confirm the general rule. The non-
economic citizen still comes second.  
 
Everson suggests in her critical review of the Court's citizenship case law 
that the Court's view of the citizen is so individualistic/ focused on the 
individual that it becomes atomistic, thus breaking down the social cohesion 
of Member States. The ECJ's vision of the Union citizen is one of a 
consumer, acting on the internal market. Thus, ”law has descended into 
economic technology, has subjectified the European as homo 
economicus...” 107. 
 
In the discourse of rights connected to citizenship, rights for the citizen 
mean inevitably no rights for the non-citizen. Citizenship is “a valuable 
status precisely because it is a closed status” – one that creates a collective 
solidarity, and whilst showing empathy to the individual the Court fails “to 
show empathy to the collective108”. This is intrinsic to the concept of 
citizenship itself – one's inclusion means the other's exclusion. As such it 
fits uneasily with the notion of universal human rights.  
 
 
 
                                                
106 See Askola p. 350 onward for a discussion and further references. 
107 Everson in Dougan & Nic Schuibhne p. 167. 
108 ibid p. 153. 
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4 An Exception to the Wholly 
Internal Rule: “The 
Genuine Appreciation of 
the Substance of Rights” 
4.1 Case law 
4.1.1 The prelude: Rottmann 
The Rottmann case concerned the planned withdrawal of naturalisation as 
German citizen of an ex-Austrian citizen due to fraudulence – a measure 
which would have rendered him stateless. The Court held that that the 
deprivation of Union Citizenship falls within the scope of Union law and 
Art 20 TFEU ”by reason to its nature and its consequences109. Although a 
cross-border connection clearly did exist, the Court did not take any use of 
this in its argumentation. 
 
4.1.2 Ruiz Zambrano 
 
The case concerned two EU national children who were born to third-
country national parents who resided illegally in Belgium. The children 
gained Belgian nationality at birth and had never relied on their free 
movement rights, so no cross-border link was established.  The national 
court requested the ECJ to clarify whether Union law prohibited the 
authorities from expelling the parents to their home state Colombia. The 
Court ruled that EU law was applicable because Art 20 TFEU prevents 
Member States, also in situations with no cross-border element, from taking 
measures that have the effect of “depriving EU citizens of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of rights conferred on them by the Citizenship 
of the Union”110. Refusing a TCN parent's residence and work permit is 
such a prohibited measure.   
 
The Advocate General had argued at length against the continued upholding 
of the cross-border requirement, claiming that ”lottery rather than logic 
would seem to be governing the exercise of EU citizenship rights”111. What 
she suggests is essentially a new stance for fundamental rights protection in 
the Union as a whole112. This reassessment is necessary in order to tackle 
                                                
109 Rottmann para 42. 
110 Ruiz Zambrano para 42. 
111 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano para 83-88 
112 ibid para 163 and 173. 
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the reverse discrimination problem as well113. Regarding the case itself, she 
argued that it follows from previous case law (Zhu and Chen, Baumbast, 
Rottmann) that the rights of residence and free movement stemming from 
art 20 and 21 TFEU are autonomous sources of residence rights, 
independently of previous exercise of free movement rights114. The ECJ, 
however, did not discuss any of this, and made no elaboration of which 
rights actually fall within the scope of Union citizenship.  
 
 
4.1.3 McCarthy 
 
The McCarthy case concerned the derived residence right of the TCN 
husband of woman with dual British and Irish nationality, who resided in 
the United Kingdom, never having relied on her free-movement rights. The 
questions referred by the national court concerned exclusively the 
application of Directive 2004/38 in this particular case. In her Opinion, AG 
Kokott reassessed the requirement of cross-border movement – either past, 
present, or prospective – in order to invoke a right of family reunification in 
the home state, according to existing case law regarding Directive 
2004/38115. She then went on to consider whether the fact that Mrs 
McCarthy has dual nationality could be sufficient for triggering a cross-
border link. Stating that the right of residence for Union citizens, for 
themselves and their family members, serves to facilitate free movement of 
Union citizens within the Union territory, she did not find sufficient reason 
for Mrs McCarthy to be treated differently from other British nationals 
seeking to invoke family reunification rights, but who do not possess 
nationality of another Member State. Regarding the reverse discrimination 
problem that thus arises, she reminded that EU law at present provides no 
means of dealing with this problem, as the treatment of EU nationals who 
have not exercised their free movement rights does not fall within the scope 
of EU law116. 
 
In its judgment, the Court did not confine itself to assess the applicability of 
Directive 2004/38, but went on assess whether a derived right of residence 
could flow from primary law. The Court ruled that Mrs McCarthy could not 
rely on her dual nationality in order to be granted a right of residency under 
EU law, which would have given her husband a derived right of residency. 
The Court pointed out that Mrs McCarthy could not rely on the ”substance 
of rights doctrine” since the measures suggested by the UK did not have the 
effect of forcing her to leave Union territory117. Neither was she impeded 
from exercising her movement rights, in accordance with art 21 TFEU 
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within Union territory. As in Ruiz Zambrano, there is no discussion of 
fundamental rights or right to family life more specifically.  
 
 
4.1.4 Dereci 
 
The Dereci cases concerned the derived right of residence for a number of 
TCN family members of Austrian nationals who once again had never 
exercised their movement rights. The Court explained that the denial of 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights refers to situations in 
which the Union citizen not only has to leave the territory of the Member 
State but Union territory as a whole118. Also, the mere fact that it might 
appear desirable for an EU national to have his TCN family members be 
able to reside with him in the territory of the Union for economic reasons or 
to keep his family together is not sufficient to successfully argue that he is 
forced to leave the territory of the Union if such a right is not granted119.  
 
Unlike in Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy, the Court does address the 
fundamental right of respect for private and family life, as stipulated in 
Article 7 of the Charter. But it refers to Article 51 of the Charter, which 
limits the scope of the Charter to situations where Member States implement 
Union Law. Ultimately the Court does not take a stance in the interpretation 
of this provision but leaves it to the national court to decide whether or not 
the situation on hand is under the scope of union law, and therefore if the 
Charter should be implemented120. 
 
In his Opinion, Advocate General Mengozzi stated that his conclusion that 
the dependency criterion was not fulfilled is based on the premise that the 
substance of the rights attaching to the status of Union citizen does not 
include the right to respect for family life enshrined in Art 7 of the Charter 
and Article 8 of the ECHR121. On the other hand, his interpretation of 
”dependency” embraces economic, legal, administrative or emotional 
dependence, which could all expose a citizen to the risk of having to leave 
the territory of the Union122 – an understanding which appears to be wider 
than the Court’s understanding of dependency. 
 
  
                                                
118 Dereci para 66. 
119 Ibid para 67. 
120 Ibid para 70-73. 
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4.1.5 Summarizing the Contents  
 
Whoever holds citizenship is guaranteed an unconditional right to reside 
within the territory of the polity- state or EU. Thus, it follows of Ruiz 
Zambrano that national measures that de facto force the citizen to leave the 
territory of the Union as a whole deprive the citizen of the enjoyment of the 
substance of rights, and are thus contrary to Article 20 TFEU. Similarly it 
follows from Article 20 TFEU and Rottmann that the right not to be 
deprived of Union citizenship is protected.  
 
The implication of McCarthy is that Article 21 TFEU protects the right of 
free movement, but it cannot be relied upon by sedentary Union citizens, not 
even by those possessing several Member State nationalities.  
 
 
4.2 Analyzing the Academic Review  
4.2.1 Lack of Clarity in Reasoning 
One aspect of which the scholars agree upon, regardless of if they lauded or 
criticized this new take on Union citizenship, is that the ECJ is to be 
criticized for its lack of clarity. As such the cases pose a threat to legal 
certainty123. Similar facts produce contrary rulings, like in Ruiz Zambrano, 
which involved static minor EU citizens and their non-EU national parents, 
and on the other hand McCarthy, which also involves static minor EU 
citizens, who were risking the loss of one non-EU citizen parent – though 
the Court was silent about them, judging instead exclusively from the point 
of view of their mother, the EU national spouse. It is not intuitively logical 
why the two TCN parents of EU citizen children can derive residency rights, 
whereas when one parent is an EU citizen, it would be plausible to split the 
family up?  Is it truly a realistic alternative that the family with one EU 
citizen and one TCN parent splits across borders, alternatively moves to 
another EU state in order to establish a cross-border connection in 
accordance with Directive 2004/38124? 
 
The cases illustrate the problem of facts versus the law distinction that is 
inherent to the preliminary ruling procedure: In Ruiz Zambrano, the Court 
assumed that if Mr Ruiz Zambrano would not be granted a residence and 
work permit, he and the children would be forced to leave the territory of 
the Union – but no assessment of their de facto possibility to make use of 
their free movement rights in order to come within the scope of Dir 2004/38 
is made. In McCarthy, the Court didn't consider the minor children of the 
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McCarthy's which apparently had special needs, which left Mrs McCarthy 
probably more dependent of her husband than otherwise, also economically, 
as she was caring for the children and thus unable to join the work force, or 
use her right to free movement and qualify under 2004/38 for that matter. 
These facts have bearings to the feminist critique of market citizenship, 
discussed in section 3.4. Instead, the actual likelihood of forced departure 
from the Union should have been established by the national courts, instead 
of presumed by the ECJ125.  
 
In Dereci, the Court left the evaluation of facts to the national court126, but it 
did not consider possible limitations to the applicants' movement rights 
either. Nic Schuibhne calls this tendency to make hasty assumptions of the 
applicants' situations from a limited reading of the facts the ”problem of 
conflation”127.  
 
The limited exploration of potential impediments to movement in the cases 
does not fit coherently with the generous approach toward movement shown 
in the Court's citizenship case law. The Court has already extended the 
material scope of EU law to ”potential impediments” to free movement, to 
not consider it here is problematic128. Nowak129 has pointed at a number of 
inconsistencies with the Court’s future versus hypothetical movement case 
law arguing that free movement could not be the explanatory factor x of the 
substance of rights test. However, it seems the Court was so anxious to 
establish limits to its competence (as not to open the flood gates) that it 
chose to overlook these inconsistencies. The Ruiz Zambrano and Rottmann 
notions of free movement are abstract at best. 
 
Cases like Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano are useful and sympathetic to the 
individual applicants, but have not brought clarity as to where the material 
scope of EU law is to be drawn130. In fact, Nic Schuibhne argues that it 
simply is not the Court's role to act as sympathetic saviours of individuals in 
particularly disheartening circumstances, as the flipside to this is arbitrary 
decisions. 
 
Weak argumentation 
In Ruiz Zambrano, The Court first presents the argumentation of the eight 
intervening Member States, but then goes on to follow a different 
interpretation, based on different premises, without motivating why the first 
interpretation was dismissed. There is instead a lack of reasoning in what 
was a rather unexpected ruling. The outcome is presented as inevitable, and 
the reasoning is built to convey this inevitability.  
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The problem of weak argumentation extends to the justification of the rights 
included as well, as no references to the sources of law from which these 
rights are taken from are provided. The only right that has so far been 
confirmed a part of the ”substance” is ”not being forced to leave the 
territory of the European union” - and the source is not defined. But 
semantically speaking, there has to be more to the substance than that. A 
substance of rights comprises by definition more than just one right131. On 
the other hand, the right not to be forced to leave Union territory is arguably 
a base, or a lowest common denominator of rights, to which all other rights 
are secondary , a core right132, making it the nuclear legal content of Union 
citizenship133. 
 
The wording 
Nic Shuibhne is critical of the wording chosen by the Court, ie ‘genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of rights’, which she thinks doesn’t well 
describe the contents vested in the phrase so far. This exception takes action 
at the literal loss of citizenship, as in Rottmann, or in a comparably extreme 
way as in Ruiz Zambrano134. Confining the scope to forced departure from 
the Union brings in to the mind a situation of crisis, of last resort situations. 
 
Article 20 TFEU confers a very open right to reside within the territory of 
the Member States- there is no ”except in your own state” proviso in the 
Treaty itself135. However, based on these judgments, citizenship is not about 
positive rights but the negative right of not being forced to leave, a very 
restrictive approach if the aim is to construe citizenship as a rights-
enhancing status. That this is the case is especially apparent when compared 
to the depth of legal protection that opens up when any connection to 
movement can be established. But on the other hand, a very high threshold 
is perhaps necessary, not least for this new EU jurisdiction to gain sufficient 
legitimacy136.  
 
The ECJ's choice to apply Article 20 TFEU in Ruiz Zambrano and Article 
21 TFEU in McCarthy has caused confusion. Wiesbrock points to 
equivocalities regarding the Court's choice to refer to two different Treaty 
provisions. Article 20 has a broader scope than Article 21, since Article 20 
includes the right to reside and move freely. It is not clear if the right to 
reside flows freely from the nature of Union citizenship or from the 
provisions, but according to Wiesbrock, the Court's reasoning in Ruiz 
Zambrano seems to suggest this. Therefore the use of Article 21 in 
McCarthy is peculiar. Maybe the Court was just eager to distinguish 
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McCarthy from Ruiz Zambrano, but for the sake of clarity, it would have 
been preferable to also refer to Article 20137.  
 
According to Schulyok, this discrepancy is not merely a coincidence or a 
result of the cases being dealt by different chambers of the Court. Instead, 
whereas the Ruiz Zambrano children could rely on Article 20 TFEU 
because the national measure of deporting their parents would have resulted 
in them, as minors, having to leave the territory of the European Union, Mrs 
McCarthy was not in a comparable position of dependency towards her 
husband; it is not a factual impossibility for her to remain in the territory of 
the Union. Thus, Article 20 TFEU is not applicable in her case138. What 
remained for the Court was to examine if the national measures could limit 
her prospective right to free movement, thus rendering Article 21 TFEU 
applicable, which it did not. So she could not rely on Union citizenship in 
order to derive a residency under Union law. In Dereci, the Court did not 
even test the applicability of Article 21, after having found Article 20 
inapplicable. This suggests that the consistency in the argument is not as 
thorough as suggested by Schulyok.  
 
Of particular concern is the statement made by the court in Dereci, 
according to which it is a task for the national courts to define what the 
essence of the EU citizenship rights are139. Kochenov claims that this means 
that the ECJ delegates the definition of the material scope of EU law in this 
field (however marginal it may be) to the national courts! This is according 
to him a threat to the uniform application of EU law, and also very unlikely, 
since that would mean that the Court lets national courts define its 
jurisdiction. Or is it just trying to avoid the question, instead inviting the 
national courts to refer further questions? Kochenov comes to the 
conclusion that the statement must in fact be a mistake140. An alternative 
explanation, offered by Schulyok, is that since the case concerned five 
different applicants, the Court was in fact suggesting that EU law (and thus 
EU fundamental rights) were applicable to some of the applicants but not 
all, and that the national court should decide whether this is the case on the 
basis of case law concerning the scope of application of EU law141. In fact, 
there is great variety amongst the different applicants: ranging from adult 
non-EU national children who had resided outside the Union, who wish to 
be unified with a now EU national parent who has resided in Austria for 
decades. On the other hand, a non-EU national chid who had legally resided 
in Austria since two years of age with his now EU national parents, and 
whose residence permit had expired, with the Austrian authorities planning 
to deport him to the country where he came from two decades ago142.  
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Kochenov143 sees the emergence of the Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano line 
of case law with great optimist, as a ”commence of a new era for EU law”, 
in which Union citizenship emerged as a source of rights in its own right, 
independent of other statuses. The subsequent rulings, which largely proved 
otherwise, have been met with frustration.  
 
Kochenov and Plender argue that the wording of the Treaty provisions on 
Union citizenship is such that a simple internal market reading fails to 
capture the contents of the provisions. Thus, the Rottmann –Ruiz Zambrano 
case line is a step to the right direction, which is to bridge the gap between 
the internal market ideology and the citizenship logic enshrined in the 
Treaties. Court should be on the side of the citizens, acting as a moral 
safeguard against nationalist and populist Member States. “Europe does not 
need nomadic rituals to discover the dignity and rights of its citizens.”144. 
 
It could certainly be said that the Court in McCarthy reassesses the 
centrality of free movement. As O’Leary points out, the Court refers in para 
27 to the free movement of persons as being one of the fundamental 
freedoms of the internal market145. Then, the Court combines the genuine 
enjoyment rule established in Ruiz Zambrano, with a requirement that their 
free movement rights, which are identified as central to that status, must be 
threatened in some way146. This again suggests the renewed relevance of the 
market citizen discourse.  
 
McCarthy clearly limits the possible implications of Ruiz Zambrano, but 
does not overall change the new approach to invoking citizenship rights – 
which are no longer necessarily linked to movement, either past, present or 
future.. In earlier case law, there was a ”factual geographic connection” of a 
specific case to cross-border movement, either in the past, present or 
potentially in the future, whereas now citizenship has been decoupled from 
such a requirement of factual geographic movement, (and replaced with a 
more theoretical idea/assumption to movement147.  
 
Wiesbrock notes that this is remarkable considering the initial internal 
market rationale behind movement and residence rights. ”By perceiving 
movement and residence as more than purely economic rights, the Court has 
successfully turned nationals of MS from ”economic factors” of the internal 
market to holders of the ”fundamental status” of Union citizenship.148” She 
thus sees evidence of the increasing degree of harmonisation within and the 
growing maturity of the concept of Union citizenship.  
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The implication of the case law line for Union citizenship, according to 
Iliopoulou149, is that the concept still provides added value mainly for the 
legal migrant with dual memberships in both a home and host Member 
State, but only exceptionally for the sedentary citizen. Thus, European 
citizenship is still not about supporting an autonomous set of rights based on 
membership in the European community. Such an order is not sufficient for 
the creation of a true transnational citizenship with an acclaimed 
fundamental status. The Court is urging citizens to take instrumental use of 
their free movement rights. But why would it be better to urge citizens to act 
like this, why pretending that a staged cross-border movement is more 
worthy than never having moved150?  
 
 
4.2.2 Fundamental Rights and the ‘Substance 
of Rights’ 
 
A recurrent critique on the case line is that there is no mention of 
fundamental rights in Ruiz Zambrano or McCarthy151. Even though 
Advocate General Sharpston discussed the fundamental rights aspect 
extensively in her Opinion, argueing that individuals should be able to 
invoke EU fundamental rights in any situation covering a field of law where 
the European Union has shared or exclusive competence152, the Court 
decided the cases purely on the basis of Union citizenship. It was thus 
unclear if fundamental rights were a part of the substance of Citizenship 
rights, as protected by Article 20 TFEU.  
 
In McCarthy, Advocate General Kokott took the stance that a Member State 
might be obliged to grant a right of residence to the spouse of a union 
citizen, but that is not a question of EU law. Otherwise, no mentions of 
fundamental rights were made153.  
 
Dereci however showed that a possible breach of the fundamental right of 
the right to family life was not enough in order to bring the case within the 
scope of EU law, with reliance on the Union citizenship provisions.  This is 
underlined in the Court's statement that the fact that it might appear 
desirable for an EU citizen in order to keep his family together, to have 
TCN members of the family to be able to reside with him in the territory of 
the Union, is not in itself sufficient to support the view that the Union 
citizen would be forced to leave Union territory if such a right is not 
granted154.  Schulyok's conclusion is that EU fundamental rights cannot in 
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themselves lead to application of EU law, in situations where no cross-
border element can be established. While Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano 
showed that EU citizenship in itself is worthy under protection of EU law, 
thus moving EU citizenship further away from a merely market citizenship, 
Dereci showed that the same is not true for EU fundamental rights155. 
Charter rights are not free-standing rights in the absence of a connection to 
other EU law provisions156.  
 
In Dereci, The Court pointed out that its conclusion that Article 20 TFEU is 
not applicable does not mean that a right of residence could not be granted 
based on other sources of law, but these have to be assessed independently 
from the issue of genuine enjoyment of Citizenship157. The Court based this  
distinction on Article 51(1) and 51(2) of the Charter, which stipulate that the 
Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify 
tasks as defined in the Treaties”158. Advocate General Mengozzi argued that 
the Union should not encroach on the powers of the Member States in 
matters concerning immigration and on those of the ECtHR in matters 
concerning family life159. Effectively, this argument is about establishing 
and maintaining sharp dividing lines between the national, ECHR and EU 
law competences. But is this division plausible? Generally speaking, If there 
is a clear breach of a human right, is it reasonable for a court (any court) to 
ignore this, claiming that it is not within their jurisdiction? 
 
Similarly, Wiesbrock questions whether a clear separation between EU law 
and human rights, as suggested by Advocate General Kokott, is still 
possible, and whether it can be argued that a perceived or possible human 
rights violation is not a question of EU law160.  
 
Earlier cases have shown that the ECJ's case law on family reunification is 
stronger and more far-reaching than ECtHR case law161. The question 
remains: Why would fundamental rights not be a part of the genuine 
enjoyment of the rights connected to Union citizenship, even if the 
protection under Article 8 ECHR is not as far-reaching? 
 
On the other hand, the extension of EU competence to family reunification 
is problematic – a hot potato – as the entry and residence of third-country 
nationals who are not family members to EU movers is by and large the 
competence of Member States162. Omitting any references to fundamental 
rights might have been a strategic omission in the light of Art 51(2) in order 
to avoid charges of competence creating. Possibly, the Court simply did not 
want to establish a direct link between Union citizenship and fundamental 
rights protection, creating the impression that Union citizenship alone would 
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be a sufficient trigger for invoking the protection of fundamental rights163 -
Or as Stanislaw Adam argues, a compromise between diverging standpoints 
within the Grand Chamber on the sensitive issue of the scope of Ruiz 
Zambrano164.  
 
Considering the Court's earlier fundamental rights case law, it would not 
have been legally impermissible to consider the right to respect for family 
life within the genuine enjoyment doctrine. According to Nic Shuibhne, the 
Court is struggling at sustaining its established approach to the protection of 
fundamental rights while also managing the limitations set out in the final 
provisions of the Charter165. The choices made in McCarthy and Dereci 
suggest that case law has entered into a more restrictive phase. In Dereci, 
the judgments appear to follow Article 51 of the Charter literally. But this 
also means that the Court has lowered its own established standards for 
fundamental rights protection, as established already in Carpenter. The 
decisions in Carpenter, Baumbast and Metock among others form a 
coherent line of case lawabout the high level at which respect for family life 
is protected within the EU legal order, that is, protecting residence in the 
citizen's home state as a matter of choice.  The decisions in McCarthy and 
Dereci also have their own coherence when it comes to the interpretation of 
Article 51 of the Charter. But the problem is that these two lines of case law 
do not fit well together166.  
 
When it comes to Ruiz Zambrano, Nic Shuibhne argues that it would have 
been legally permissible for the Court to consider fundamental rights - when 
the Court found the children's situation to fall within Article 20 TFEU, an 
assessment of fundamental rights would have been the ”usual secondary 
obligation related to a situation that was already grounded in the Treaty and 
thus within the scope of EU law167.  
 
It is problematic to address fundamental rights in this haphazard way. They 
need to be addressed consistently, or else their impact as an appropriate 
motivation will be weakened, risking a loss of legitimacy168. On the other 
hand, an assertive approach to fundamental rights protection can undermine 
the shared competence between EU and Member States, potentially placing 
every Member state action under scrutiny from the ECJ. This also sits 
uneasily with the Treaty wording of EU citizenship as additional. 
 
 As Wiesbrock put it, “The judgments touch upon the essence of the two 
core questions underlying the whole body of citizenship case law: the proper 
division of competences between the Union and the Member States on the 
one hand, and the division of tasks between the judiciary and the legislator.” 
The evolution of citizenship rights during the last twenty years was arguably 
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not the intention of the Maastricht Treaty drafters. Thus, it is often argued169 
that the extension of citizenship rights to non-movers should be decided by 
the legislator rather than in courts.  But Wiesbrock also reminds that the 
Member States have been complicit in this development as well, for 
example by codifying ECJ case law in Directive 2004/38170.  
 
When a field of law is developed through a case law approach, with the 
legislator following the decisions of the Court, the development is inevitably 
not straight-forward, but rather crooked, with its developments following 
the Court's understanding of how far it can go under the prevailing political 
climate. But this kind of a casuistic approach sits badly with the Court's role 
as an instance of preliminary rulings, where its aim is to provide general 
guidance on the application of EU law171.  
 
In Kochenov's words, shaping clarity will be of utmost importance in the 
future case law in the field, if the concept of union citizenship is to have any 
significance at all/ avoiding it to be marginalized into oblivion172. 
 
 
 
4.3 Identifying the Discourses  
The reading of the academic review over the Ruiz Zambrano-Dereci line of 
case law in the previous section has revealed that two conflicting narratives 
are discernable. To some extent this is guiding the reactions to the case law.  
 
The first narrative is one in which Union citizenship is seen as a source of 
positive rights.  Here, the focus is on universal all-encompassing rights 
which relate to third-country nationals and sedentary Union citizens as 
much as Union citizens who have exercised free movement rights. In the 
Court, this approach is especially visible in Advocate General Sharpston’s 
Opinion in Ruiz Zambrano. Among scholars, notably Kochenov, there is a 
keenness to maintain the revolutionary meaning of Ruiz Zambrano while 
downplaying the limiting effect of McCarthy, and Dereci  and as new cases 
are decided, a growing exasperation.  
 
The other narrative reveals an interest in establishing and de-limiting the 
scope of Union citizenship vis-á-vis Member State competences. This 
approach dominates Advocate General Mengozzi’s Opinion in Dereci. The 
focus is on defining the negative scope of citizenship, its ulterior limits is 
the main concern here. This narrative is essentially content with the market 
citizen notion of Union citizenship for the time being, asserting that the 
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trigger of cross-border movement is necessary to maintain the divisions of 
competences that follows from the principle of conferral.  
 
The ambivalent reasoning of the ECJ, while possibly a mishap, suggests that 
the Court is indeed conflicted.  In a misguided attempt to not step on any 
toes it chooses to first conceal and obscure the reasoning behind a radical 
judgment, then trying to correct the mistakes afterwards by reinterpreting 
and constructing boundaries. 
 
 
 
 38 
5 New Cases 
 
5.1 Iida 
5.1.1 Facts 
The case concerned the derived right of residence of a Japanese national, 
who resided (and worked) in Germany and shared custody of her daughter, 
now residing with her mother in Austria after having moved there from 
Germany. Thus, contrary to the Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci 
rulings, a cross-border situation undoubtedly exists here.  Mr Iida 
maintained his relationship with his daughter with monthly visits to Vienna, 
and she spent her vacations with him in Germany. He originally had a 
national residence permit as the foreign spouse of a German national, but 
the validity of this permit was not extended after the spouses' moving apart. 
Instead, Mr Iida held a national residence permit linked to his employment, 
but he chose not to reapply, instead applying for a residence permit based on 
EU law by virtue of the right of custody to his daughter.  
 
The national court referred a number of questions regarding the application 
of Directive 2004/38, Treaty provisions and the Charter and general 
principles of EU law in this case, through which it essentially conveyed a 
number of alternatives on how a right of residence could be motivated in 
Mr. Iida's case. As a summary, the national court wanted to know if under 
European law a third-country national parent who has custody of a Union 
citizen child has a right to remain in the Member State of origin of the child, 
if the child moves from there to another Member State173. 
 
5.1.2 The Opinion of Advocate General 
Trstenjak 
The Advocate General concludes firstly that no right of residence could be 
derived from Directive 2004/38, as the Directive does not accommodate the 
granting of a residence permit for a parent who wishes to remain in the 
Member State of origin while the beneficiary, the child, moves to another 
Member State174. She then moves on to the question if a residence permit 
could be granted on the basis of primary law, in the light of fundamental 
rights guaranteed under 6(1) and 3 TEU and pursuant to Articles 20 TFEU 
and 21 TFEU. According to her summary of previous cases Ruiz Zambrano 
and Zhu and Chen, such a right could be derived if the ”effective exercise of 
the Union citizen's legal position would … be harmed substantially” if the 
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third-country national parent were denied a right of residence175. This is not 
the case for the daughter of Mr Iida, as she had already exercised her 
freedom of movement, and thus, ”the essence of the practical effect of her 
legal position” as a Union citizen is not under threat176.  
 
The Advocate General's assessment of fundamental rights as a source for 
residence is based on the Dereci judgment and especially on the 
categorization of competences presented there177. Regarding the controversy 
on interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Charter, referred above in section 
2.4, she argues that based on the case law referenced in the explanations of 
the Charter, the Charter should apply in such a situation178.  
 
The assessment of the facts when it comes to a possible restriction of free 
movement is the domain of the national court. But the Advocate General 
points out that the undermined residence of the father could present a 
potential impediment to the daughter's future exercise of free movement. 
Based on the facts that have been presented so far, this cannot be answered. 
The national court should also take into account the possibility of the 
applicant's entitlement to a national residence permit179.  
 
If a connection to Article 21 TFEU is established and the Charter thus 
applicable, it remains to be evaluated if the current situation is a breach 
against the right of respect for family life, Charter Article 7 and to the rights 
of the child, Charter Article 24. If the denial of residence were to undermine 
the father's ability to maintain a regular contact with his child, this could 
constitute an interference with a fundamental right, and this would have to 
be assessed from the standpoint of proportionality180.  
 
She finally reminds the national court that under Article 52(3) the rights of 
the Charter correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR but that there is no 
restriction for the EU law to provide a more extensive protection. Article 8 
ECHR is applicable to parent-child relations also when the two do not live 
together permanently181.  
 
 
5.1.3 The Judgment 
The Court first sets out to ascertain whether the applicant could rely on 
secondary law in order to gain a right of residence under Union law. Though 
it was not compatible with Mr Iida's application nor requested by the 
national court, the Court starts with an assessment of Directive 2003/109, 
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which obliges Member States to grant long-term residency for third-country 
nationals who have resided in the Member State for a longer period of time. 
The Court finds that there was no apparent hinder for Mr Iida to be granted 
long-term residence on this basis, but that he voluntarily withdrew his 
application, which means he cannot be granted long-term residency under 
the prevailing conditions.  
 
Like the Advocate General, the Court finds Directive 2004/38 inapplicable, 
as the applicant neither accompanied nor joined his union citizen family 
members in the host Member State182. 
 
Moving on to an assessment based on primary law, the Court recalls 
previous case law, like the cases Zhu and Chen and Dereci, claiming that 
the common denominator for those cases is that the situations that they 
concerned were such that although they a priori fall in the competence of the 
Member States as opposed to Union law, they ”nonetheless have an intrinsic 
connection with the freedom of movement of a Union citizen which prevents 
the right of entry and residence from being refused... in order not to interfere 
with that freedom.183” Considering the facts, the Court notes firstly that Mr 
Iida is not applying for residence in the host Member State, and secondly, 
that the risk of his absence of residence has not hindered his family 
members from moving. Thirdly, the Court points to its earlier assessment of 
the applicant's right of long term residency based on Directive 2003/109, 
and concludes that the suggested measure of not granting the applicant 
residence based on primary law is not liable to deny his spouse or daughter 
the genuine enjoyment of the rights associated with their status as Union 
citizens, nor impede the exercise of their right to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States184. In contrast to the Advocate 
General’s considerations of the potential impediments to the daughter’s 
future exercise of free movement, the Court states that purely hypothetical 
prospects of obstruction to freedom of movement  could not be 
considered185. 
 
Finally, just as in Dereci, there is a reminder that in accordance with Article 
51(1) of the Charter, the provisions are addressed to the Member States only 
when implementing Union law, and that the Charter does not extend or 
modify the powers of the Union. It is for the national court to interpret 
whether the national measure falls within the implementation of Union 
law186.  
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5.2 O, S and L v Maahanmuuttovirasto 
5.2.1 Facts 
 
The joint cases contain yet another variation of the minor Union Citizen 
situation, this time in the context of a reconstituted family, where the right 
to residence of a minor Union citizen's mother's new spouse is under 
scrutiny. Specifically, the Union citizen was born into the marriage of a 
third country national mother and a Finnish national father. After the 
parents' separation, the child had continued to live with her mother, which 
gained a permanent residence right in Finland. The mother then remarried to 
a third-country national without right of residence, and a child –the Union 
citizen's half-sibling –was born. The half-sibling is not a Union citizen, but 
has instead obtained the mother’s non-EU citizenship. In one of the cases, 
the TCN father continued to reside with the family in Finland, in the other 
case, he had been returned to his country of origin. 
 
The national court essentially requested guidance on the interpretation of 
Union citizenship rights in the light of the Ruiz Zambrano ruling in the 
specific context of a reconstituted family where the applicant does not have 
parental responsibility over the Union citizen child187.  
 
5.2.2 The Opinion of Advocate General Bot 
 
The Advocate General distinguishes the situations on hand from the 
situation in the Ruiz Zambrano ruling. Firstly, the applicants are not the 
parents of the Union citizen children, whose care is the exclusive 
responsibility of their mothers. Thus a decision to not grant the applicants 
residence permits would not derive the children of their subsistence. And if 
the mother would choose to leave Union territory in order to preserve family 
life, thus inciting the minor union citizen to follow along, this would not be 
an effect of the national measure as such, but a manifestation of the mother's 
free choice188. The interpretation of the Ruiz Zambrano ruling that was set 
out in Dereci was particularly restrictive – a possible scenario might 
concern an adult child of whom a parent is dependent because of illness or 
disability, but surely not the situation on hand. Extending the residence right 
of third country nationals based on Article 20 TFEU would play against 
secondary law, namely Directive 2003/86, which determines the conditions 
for the exercise of the right to family reunification for third-country 
nationals residing lawfully in the territory of the Member States. The 
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purpose of this directive is to promote family reunification189. Advocate 
General Bot finds this Directive applicable in both of the situations on hand. 
Consequently, he also finds that the national court is obliged to interpret the 
relevant provisions in the Directive in light of the Charter and the ECHR. 
The national court is reminded of the necessity to interpret Article 7 of the 
Charter in accordance with the case law of the ECtHR190.  
 
5.2.3 The Judgment 
The Court elaborates on the confines of the Ruiz Zambrano judgment by 
way of Dereci:  It is not decisive for the assessment whether the applicant 
lives together with the other family members or not, neither is its 
applicability confined to blood relationships between the applicant and the 
Union citizen. What is relevant is that the mothers of the minor Union 
citizens have a permanent right of residence, and whether the Union citizens 
are legally, financially or emotionally dependent of the applicants. 
Furthermore, the relevant relationship of dependency is between the Union 
citizen and the applicant himself191, i e, it is a question of direct dependency. 
The Court states that such a dependency is not present in the cases on hand, 
but that is for the national court to ultimately decide.  
 
Having clarified that, the Court goes on to point out that this does not rule 
out the possibility that the applicants could not be refused residence permits 
based on other criteria, such as the right to the protection of family life192. 
Without the national court having requested clarification, the Court goes on 
to give guidelines on the applicability of Directive 2003/86. The Directive 
must be interpreted in the light of the Charter provisions, which require the 
Member States to take into account the interests of the children concerned 
and also with the promotion of family life, and avoiding any undermining of 
the objective and the effectiveness of the Directive193.  
 
 
5.3 Alokpa & Moudoulou 
5.3.1 The Facts 
This case concerns yet another variation of the Ruiz Zambrano minor Union 
citizen scenario, this time with Union citizen children residing with their 
TCN mother in a Member State other than that of their nationality, never 
having exercised free movement rights. The mother of the twins, who were 
born prematurely, did not have a regularised residence permit in 
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Luxembourg. After their birth, the father, a French national, acknowledged 
paternity and the children thus became Union citizens. The children had no 
further contact with their father. They continued to reside in Belgium with 
their mother, who thus applied for a derived right of residence as the carer 
of union citizen minors. The national court requested clarification as to 
whether Article 20 TFEU, read in the light of Ruiz Zambrano, posed a 
hinder to dismissing her application194. 
 
5.3.2 The Opinion of Advocate General 
Mengozzi 
  
Firstly, the Advocate General distinguishes the case from Ruiz Zambrano. 
Article 20 TFEU is to be taken into account when no cross-border 
connection can be established, which is not the case here, because the 
children are citizens of one Member State, residing in another. In this sense 
the Advocate General likened the situation to the one in Zhu and Chen, 
where the Court found the situation to fall within the scope of what is now 
Directive 2004/38195.  
 
Even though Article 20 TFEU is not applicable, it is still necessary to 
consider whether the planned national measure of expulsion potentially risks 
forcing the Union citizens to leave the territory of the Union, thus depriving 
them of the effective enjoyment of the substance of rights conferred by 
virtue of their status as Union citizens196.  
 
As French nationals, the Alokpa children have the unconditional right to 
enter and remain in France. Under such circumstances, it is not possible for 
French authorities to refuse Ms Alokpa, the sole carer of the children, a 
derived right of residence. Thus the children would not be forced to leave 
the territory of the Union. With regard to the job offer that she has received 
in Luxembourg, she could carry out her employment as a frontier worker, 
”like thousands of other French residents”197.  
 
5.3.3 The Judgment 
First, the Court refers to its earlier case law regarding Union citizenship. 
The rights of a third-country national based on Treaty provisions on Union 
citizenship are not autonomous rights of the TCN, but rights derived from 
“the exercise of freedom of movement by a Union citizen”. The purpose of 
those derived rights is based on the fact that not granting them would 
interfere with freedom of movement by ”discouraging the [Union] citizen 
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from exercising his rights of entry and residence in the host Member 
State”198.  
 
It is for the national court to assess whether the provisions of Directive 
2004/38 and 21 TFEU are applicable. In accordance with Iida, a third-
country national who is not dependent of the holder of the residence right, 
but of whom the holder is dependent of cannot be regarded as a dependant 
family member within the meaning of the Directive. But, as the Court found 
in Zhu and Chen, a refusal to allow a right of residence to a parent, whether 
a third-country national or a Union citizen, who is the carer of a Union 
citizen who resides in a host member state, would deprive the child's right of 
residence of any useful effect.199.  
 
The Court goes on to assess the ”very specific” situations in which, though 
secondary law does not apply, right of residence cannot be refused because 
it would force the Union citizen to leave the territory of the Union, thus 
depriving him of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of rights connected 
to his status as a Union citizen. Here the Court agrees with Advocate 
General Mengozzi's opinion that even if the Luxembourg authorities would 
not grant residence to the applicant, she would still have the right to derived 
residence in France and thus the children would not be forced to leave 
Union territory altogether200.  
 
 
5.4 O & S  
5.4.1 The Facts 
The cases concerned the right of residence of third-country national family 
members of Union citizens who have exercised their right of movement to a 
varying degree - either working, residing or consuming services in another 
state than the Member State of origin, where the derived residence permit is 
now requested. As such, the judgment is not within the scope of this thesis. 
However, in her ambitiously written opinion, Advocate General Sharpston 
sought to bring clarity and coherence to the current status of Union 
citizenship case law. Thus she discussed the recent rulings on Union 
citizenship, and her conclusions have relevance also regarding the 
”substance of rights” doctrine.  
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5.4.2 The Opinion of Advocate General 
Sharpston  
 
Firstly, a genealogy of the derived rights of residence is presented: The 
notion was developed in the context of the economic freedoms of 
movement, in particular those of migrant workers. ”Workers are human 
beings, not automata”, she points out, and forcing them to leave behind their 
family members, who are possibly dependent of them, could lead to them 
being discouraged from exercising their right to free movement201. Through 
the introduction of Union citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty, the right to 
move and reside freely within the territory of Member States was decoupled 
from the demand for a pursuit of economic activity, a notion which was 
confirmed in Baumbast202.  
 
Assumably based on the Dereci and Iida rulings, the Advocate General 
states that in the current state of EU law, derived rights of residence in 
principle only exist where these are necessary to ensure that EU citizens can 
exercise their free movement and residence rights effectively. Rules 
governing freedom of movement can only exceptionally be applied to cases 
that show no actual connection with situations governed by EU law. Thus, if 
a national measure would oblige EU citizens to leave the territory of the EU 
as a whole, then that would fall within the exception. In Iida, the Court 
clarified that this test was not limited to situations that otherwise would be 
classified as purely internal203. 
 
Sharpston is critical of the ‘division of competences’ regarding fundamental 
rights and citizenship provisions that was established in Dereci, where the 
Court proclaimed that even if residence could not be granted based on Art 
icles 20 and 21 TFEU, the national court may still require residence to be 
granted based on either Article 7 of the Charter or Article 8(1) of the ECHR 
(for other situations). According to Sharpston, it seems that the Court 
establishes at least three separate grounds for a right of residence under EU 
law: the right to family life (Article 7 Charter), the right to free movement 
and residence (Article 21 TFEU) and the deprivation of genuine enjoyment 
of the substance of Union citizenship rights (Article 20 TFEU). Should the 
same test be applied in order to determine both whether EU law applies and 
whether denying residence is contrary to Article 20 or 21 TFEU204? Granted 
that the Charter currently does not provide free-standing rights, could a 
situation really fall within the scope of EU law if Articles 20 or 21 TFEU 
are not applicable: is it not then a wholly internal situation? 
 
Instead, Sharpston argues that no such division is necessary: if the Treaty 
provisions apply, then the Charter applies, meaning essentially that a 
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provision such as Article 20 or 21 TFEU is not simply a basis for residence 
status separate from Article 7 of the Charter. Treaty provisions such as the 
afore-mentioned must always be implemented in a Charter-compliant 
manner205.  
 
Taking a nod toward critics who have been anxious at keeping Union 
competence at bay, she argues that such an approach does not extend the 
scope of EU law; it is a fundamental principle in a Union based on the rule 
of law that all relevant provisions, also those of constitutional provenience 
are to be taken into account when interpreting a legal provision. As such, 
taking into account the Charter is no more intrusive to the Member States' 
competence than by now well-established interpretations on free movement 
of goods206.  
 
On the other hand, situations that fall outside the scope of EU law are, as 
discussed earlier, to be interpreted in accordance with the ECtHR case law. 
Following Article 52(3) of the Charter, the fundamental rights standard to 
be applied is the same207.  
 
She also compellingly addresses the problem of reverse discrimination, 
which is a logical effect of the free movement requirement as it is applied 
today. When a situation is labelled a purely internal situation, Member 
States are enabled to treat their own nationals worse than other EU 
nationals, which is ill-at ease with ”the solidarity that is presumed to 
underlie the relationship between a Member State and its own nationals. 
Also, the effect which the free movement provision Article 21 has is 
counterproductive to its aim: the provision is about guaranteeing the right to 
move and reside freely, that is the free choice to move or not. A measure 
that places the citizen in a situation where he is compelled to move in order 
to keep his family together does not promote this aim208.  These arguments 
have resonance not least when it comes to the Court's reasoning in 
McCarthy.  
 
 
5.4.3 The Judgment 
 
While generally uninteresting for this thesis, as it focuses on the 
technicalities of Directive 2004/38, taking no ambition to react to Advocate 
General Sharpston’s assertive Opinion, the following statement is 
noteworthy. ”Any rights conferred on third-country nationals by provisions 
of EU law on Union citizenship are rights derived from the exercise of 
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freedom of movement by a Union citizen”209..  Free movement is once again 
placed center-stage! 
 
 
 
5.5 Analysis 
 
 
How (if in any way) are fundamental rights then assessed in the new 
judgments – as in which language of rights is used? Starting from Advocate 
General Trstenjak’s Opinion in Iida, it is notable that the language of rights 
is clearly toned down. Compared to “the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of rights”, the “essence of the practical effect of [the Union 
citizen’s] legal position” sounds positively bland.  
 
In his Opinion for O, S & L, AG Bot ruled out TCN family members’ 
manifestations of free choice from constituting a deprivation of the 
substance of rights for the Union citizen. But what is the worth of free 
choice in a situation where one is forced to choose between living with one 
biological child or the parent of another biological child? In her Opinion for 
O & S, AG Sharpston reassesses free choice in contrast to AG Bot’s 
statement. Her declaration of workers as “human beings not automata” is in 
stark contrast to AG Mengozzi who deems it natural for a single mother of 
twins to relocate herself to a new state.  
 
The “problem” of fundamental rights is represented as a question of proper 
delimitation of competences, and the compartmentalization technique that 
we saw in Dereci is repeated in every judgment and Opinion except in 
Sharpston’s Opinion.   
 
In Iida, the Court’s choice to assess residence rights based the long-term 
residency without it being requested shows the Court’s urgency to mark that 
citizenship rights based on account of primary law are only to be applied in 
situations where no other remedies are available to the applicant. Instead, it 
is not for Mr Iida to choose on which grounds he is granted a right of 
residence. Because he had withdrawn his application for long-term 
residence based on Directive 2003/109, one can only assume that he would 
have preferred to be granted the derived right of residence based on his 
paternal position to his Union citizen daughter. As a conclusion, the Court is 
very much focused on the boundaries of rights as opposed to the positive 
contents of the rights. 
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Amongst the rights addressed in these judgments, the right to free 
movement is prevailing, as is shown by the Court’s re-reading of previous 
judgments as having “an intrinsic connection with the freedom of movement 
of a Union citizen”, a statement that is later repeated. For practically every 
case, the Court seems to be reassessing its relevance, even though it had all 
but forgotten it in the Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano rulings. To compare, in 
Rottmann, a cross-border connection did exist, but the Court chose to take 
no note of it.   
 
Similarly to Wiesbrock’s understanding (section 4.2.1) that the free 
movement notion had evolved into something more abstract than the 
geographical connection of earlier case law, AG Trstenjak opened for the 
possibility that potential impediments to future free movement could fall 
within the scope of Union law. But as we saw in the judgment, the Court 
rejected this thought, confining the limits on this front as well. 
 
As has been pointed out extensively in the literature commenting the Ruiz 
Zambrano case line, a high threshold is perhaps necessary in the light of the 
division of competences between Member States and the Union 
respectively. But this is also a quite nihilistic notion, and reminiscent of 
Giorgio Agamden’s notion of ”bare life”210, the status which remains when 
all rights are expelled.  
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6 Conclusion – and A Look 
Ahead 
Between Union citizenship as a fundamental status and the instrumental 
form of citizenship embedded in the notion of market citizenship, what is 
the true meaning of the ‘substance of rights’ doctrine in the light of the 
latest judgments? The conclusion reached in this thesis is that the 
universalist notion of Union citizenship has taken a step back and has been 
put in the box again. Meanwhile, the saga continues. New cases concerning 
the derived right of residence of TCN family members to Union citizens are 
pending: a request for a preliminary ruling from Spanish Supreme court 
concerns the derived residence right of a third-country national parent of a 
dependent union citizen minor in the situation where the parent has a 
criminal record in the country of desired residence211.   
 
Also, though slightly outside the core of the case law that has been analyzed 
in this thesis, but still very much concerning the question of rights of free 
movement and residence of Union citizens, is the pending case of McCarthy 
and others212, in which Advocate General argues for a wider interpretation 
of Directive 2004/38 to be applicable even in situations where Union 
citizens with multiple nationalities when they move to a Member State that 
strictly observed is their Member State of origin either because the citizen 
holds nationality in this state or otherwise, but where the move in fact 
resembles the exercise of free movement. The arguments used by the 
Advocate General against nitpicking on the technicalities of the Directive 
and in favour of a greater inclusiveness fall very much into the universalist 
discourse of citizenship as a fundamental status.  
The struggle continues.  
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Secretary of State for the Home Department, delivered on 25 November 
2010 
 
Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in case C-256/11 Murat Dereci and 
others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, delivered on 29 September 2011 
 
Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in case C-40/11 Yoshikazu Iida v 
Stadt Ulm, delivered on 15 May 2012 
 
Opinion of Advocate General Bot in joined cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O 
and S v Maahanmuuttovirasto; Maahanmuuttovirasto v L, delivered on 27 
September 2012 
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Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in case C-86/12 Alokpa and 
Moudoulou v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration, 
delivered on 21 March 2013 
 
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in joined cases C-456/12 and C-
457/12 Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v O; Minister voor 
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v S, delivered on 12 December 2013 
 
Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in case C-202/13 Sean Ambrose 
McCarthy and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
delivered on 20 May 2014 
 
 
 
Requests for Preliminary Ruling 
 
 
Case C-165/14 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo 
(Spain) lodged on 7 April 2014 — Alfredo Rendón Marín v Administración 
del Estado, available at the Curia website http://curia.europa.eu 
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